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David Stump’s book Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science: Alterna-
tive Interpretations of the A Priori defends a pragmatic account of constitutive
principles in science by analyzing their historical evolution and contemporary
signiﬁcance. The book divides naturally into two main parts. First, it gives a
novel introduction to the philosophical development of the pragmatic a priori
starting from Poincaré’s conventionalism, continuing with the logical empiri-
cist’s take on a priori principles, and ﬁnishing with the pragmatic theories of
a priori developed by Arthur Pap and C. I. Lewis. In the second part of the book
the author illustrates the constitutive status of Newton’s laws of motion and
furthermore deals with two philosophical problems: (1) conceptual change and
the role of constitutive elements in theory transitions and (2) the role of mathe-
matics in physics. The book makes original contributions in both domains, offer-
ing original scholarly analysis of the development of the pragmatic a priori and
interesting contemporary discussion of theory change and the relationship be-
tween mathematics and physics.
The book starts with the fascinating history of the emergence of non-Euclidean
geometries, the debate that followed regarding geometry’s epistemic status and
Poincaré’s conventionalism. Poincaré’s introduction of the notion of convention
can be seen as the initial step toward relativizing the Kantian synthetic a priori
and introducing the pragmatic element in ﬁxing the principles in a theoretical
framework. While the interpretations surrounding Poincaré’s conventionalism
are diverse and often conﬂicting, the book aims to offer a coherent reading of
Poincaré’s positions, highlightinghis contribution to the development of the prag-
matic a priori. Stump gives a detailed analysis of Poincaré’s arguments for the
conventional understanding of mechanics and geometry and argues that Poin-
caré should be taken to develop two types of conventionalism. The motivation
for this reading is twofold. First, the scope and applicability of conventions are
different. Poincaré defends a hierarchical understanding of scientiﬁc theories, ac-
cording to which geometry needs to be in place for the formulation of mechan-
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ics and further empirical laws that presuppose mechanics. Second, Poincaré
takes a different attitude toward the truth-value of mechanics and geometry.
Stump claims that while geometry lacks truth-value and is evaluated merely in
terms of its convenience, the laws of motion are truth apt. By taking Poincaré
to be defending a two-type conventionalism, Stump highlights an important
aspect of Poincaré’s epistemology of science. He shows the important differ-
ence between geometry and mechanics with regard to their function and how
Poincaré’s epistemology makes a ﬁrst step into the development of the prag-
matic a priori. The book follows Hans Reichenbach’s further development of
Poincaré’s insights and advancement of a relativized notion of a priori princi-
ples. Reichenbach’s insight is that principles that play the role of a priori pre-
suppositions in a speciﬁc theory cannot be regarded as ﬁxed across theoretical
frameworks but are dynamic and change in theory transition.
The book discusses accounts of constitutive principles developed by the pos-
itivists, for example, in the early work of Moritz Schlick and the later of Ru-
dolph Carnap and the parallel development of alternative accounts in the work
of Ernst Cassirer, C. I. Lewis, and Arthur Pap. Stump goes into particular detail
when discussing Lewis’s theory of pragmatic a priori principles and Pap’s theory
of functional a priori, two theories that have not received much attention in
the contemporary literature and that offer alternative ways to account for the
special role that physical principles, as well as mathematics and logic, play in
scientiﬁc theories. These accounts of a priori principles motivate Stump’s own
position, which he defends with a discussion of Newton’s laws.
The pragmatic account of a priori principles defended in the book shares im-
portant elements with Quinean holism, insofar as the principles that act as a
priori presuppositions are ultimately revisable by experience. The difference be-
tween the account developed in the book and epistemic holism is the focus
on the role the a priori elements play in the theoretical framework—they func-
tion as constitutive presuppositions making empirical inquiry possible. Stump
claims that the Quinean notion of entrenchment does not capture the essential
epistemic difference between constitutive principles and empirical claims. Tech-
nically speaking, the existence of a priori knowledge is denied and the func-
tional a priori is understood in a very narrow sense—as a constitutive precon-
dition of empirical investigation. The functional a priori elements originate in
experience and are not ﬁxed across theoretical frameworks; they are dynamic.
What elements will be ﬁxed as constitutive a priori is ultimately down to a prag-
matic choice.
The conception of constitutive elements in science developed in this book
comes very close to Michel Friedman’s development of the relativized a priori
in his Dynamics of Reason (Stanford, CA: CSLI, 2001). Stump agrees with
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Friedman’s main ideas on the nature of constitutive principles, his objection
to Quine’s epistemic holism, and the idea that constitutive principles should
be seen as relativized a priori principles and not necessary truths. The disagree-
ment with Friedman’s position concerns the role of philosophy in securing the
rational transition fromone theoretical framework to another. Contrary to Fried-
man, the author opposes seeing philosophy as a metaframework establishing
the rationality of theory change and adopts a position much closer to Ian Hack-
ing’s “styles of reasoning,” which does not commit him to foundationalism.
Apart from the problem of theory change, the book also engages with a
widely discussed debate in philosophy of science, the role of mathematics in
physics, and offers a pragmatist solution to the problem of the applicability
of mathematics. Contrary to many contemporary philosophers who use the in-
dispensability argument to argue for Platonism, Stump argues that his account
of constitutive principles can explain how mathematics gains its special role in
science, without the unnecessary commitments to abstract entities. This solu-
tion is sensitive both to practices in mathematics and to the question of how
abstract mathematics can be used for the representation of concrete physical
phenomena. I think the author could have defended the advantages of his ac-
count even further, for example, by pointing out that the theory of constitutive
principles can accommodate for the plurality of mathematical formalisms that
an empirically successful theory can employ. While I found the author’s resis-
tance to a holistic approach to scientiﬁc theories and appeal to indispensability
arguments to explain the usefulness of mathematics very well founded, the book
had the potential to go into more depth to explain where the proposed account
stands in the recent debates on the representational role of mathematics.
This book illustrates excellently that the questions regarding the status and
role of constitutive principles in science continue to preoccupy philosophers of
science today as much as they did a century ago. Stump shows that there are
still many interesting questions in the debate to be addressed, both regarding
the historical developments and contemporary issues in the foundations of sci-
ence. Furthermore, whereas the role of functional a priori principles in science
was originally developed in the context of space-time theories, it is clear that
these principles ﬁgure much more broadly across the disciplines, leaving the
development of a more interdisciplinary and pluralistic account open for future
development.
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